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Abstract 
 
Democracy resolves conflicts in difficult games like Prisoners’ Dilemma and 
Chicken by stabilizing their cooperative outcomes.  It does so by transforming these 
games into games in which voters are presented with a choice between a cooperative 
outcome and a Pareto-inferior noncooperative outcome.  In the transformed game, it is 
always rational for voters to vote for the cooperative outcome, because cooperation is a 
weakly dominant strategy independent of the decision rule and the number of voters who 
choose it.  Such games are illustrated by 2-person and n-person public-goods games, in 
which it is optimal to be a free rider, and a biblical story from the book of Exodus. 
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How Democracy Resolves Conflict in Difficult Games1 
1.  Introduction 
A cornerstone of democracy is fair and periodic elections.  While there is an 
ongoing debate about how best to conduct elections (Brams, 2008), here we assume that 
voters choose between two alternatives, and the alternative with the most votes wins.   
We say that voting in a democracy resolves conflict if the electorate considers (i) 
the voting process fair and (ii) the outcome chosen acceptable.  There may not be a 
consensus among the voters that the alternative chosen is the best, but as long as some 
agreed-upon minimum number of voters (e.g., a majority) support some alternative, this 
outcome will be implemented.   
In this paper, we focus on choices that are costly to implement.  For example, if 
voters in a referendum decide to finance a public project, the cost of this project will be 
reflected in higher taxes they must pay.   We assume that citizens must pay taxes, though 
later we consider the problem, especially in developing countries, that laws may be 
difficult to enforce.  
Suppose the public project to be financed is renovation of a public park, which can 
benefit everybody—but more so those who use the park frequently than those who don’t.  
In this case, some would argue that those who use the park frequently should pay more 
for its renovation, such as through the Central Park Conservancy in New York City, 
which solicits voluntary contributions.  But this voluntary approach leads to a public-
goods or free-rider problem, which we model as an n-person Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD).   
                                                 
1 We thank Todd R. Kaplan, Christian Klamler, Maria Montero, Brian Skyrms, and Donald Wittman for 
valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
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2.  Resolution by Voting in a 2-Person PD 
To render the subsequent analysis as transparent as possible, we begin with a 2-
person PD, wherein one player is a wealthy individual who can make a big contribution 
to the renovation of the park.  Suppose his or her contribution is expected to equal the 
contributions made by the rest of the public, whom we treat as a single player.  In the 
ranking of payoffs to the players below, we assume that the wealthy individual and the 
rest of the public both prefer partial renovation without contributing (4) to full renovation 
with contributing (3) to no renovation without contributing (2) to partial renovation with 
contributing (1), as shown in the payoff matrix below:  
Rest of Public
! 
" 
Wealthy Individual 
! 
" 
Contribute Don’t contribute 
Contribute Full renovation: (3,3) Partial renovation: (1,4) 
Don’t contribute Partial renovation: (4,1) No renovation: (2,2) 
 
Key: (x, y) = payoff ranking to (wealhy individual, rest of public), where 4 = best, 3 = 
         next best, 2 = next worst, and 1 = worst.   
         Nash equilibrium underscored. 
 
Each player’s strategy of don’t contribute strictly dominates its strategy of 
contribute, because it is better whichever strategy the other player chooses.  Each player, 
therefore, has an incentive to be a free rider, obtaining the benefit of the public good 
without contributing to it.  
But the choice by both players of don’t contribute leads to the next-worst outcome 
of (2,2), which is the unique Nash equilibrium—neither player would have an incentive 
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unilaterally to depart from it lest it do worse (by obtaining 1).2   The dilemma is that (2,2) 
is worse for both players than the cooperative outcome of (3,3), wherein both players 
contribute.  But the latter outcome is not a Nash equilibrium—each player would have an 
incentive unilaterally to depart from its strategy associated with it (to obtain 4)—
rendering it unstable.   
To be sure, (3,3) may be stabilized under certain conditions—for example, in 
tournament play (Axelrod, 1984), in strategies that evolve over time (Skyrms, 1996; 
Nowak, 2006), or when players are farsighted (Brams, 1994).3  Farsighted thinking, 
which nonhuman animals seem incapable of, is epitomized by Theodore Sorensen’s 
statement about the deliberations of the Executive Committee (ExCom) during the 
October 1962 Cuban missile crisis:  
We discussed what the Soviet reaction would be to any possible move by the 
United States, what our reaction with them would have to be to that Soviet 
reaction, and so on, trying to follow each of those roads to their ultimate 
conclusions (Holsti, Brody, and North, 1964, p. 188). 
 
                                                 
2 The Nash equilibrium is actually the pair of pure strategies of the players associated with (2,2), not the 
outcome itself, but for convenience we identify Nash equilibria by the outcomes they produce.  We cannot 
consider mixed strategies in this or other 2 x 2 games that we discuss later, because payoffs are ordinal 
rankings, not cardinal utilities, precluding expected-utility calculations that underlie the determination of 
mixed strategies. 
3 Farsightedness offers a very different resolution of PD than tournament play or evolution.  Pinker (2007, 
p. 71) distinguishes the former from the latter by arguing that “natural selection [in evolution] is like a 
design engineer in the sense that parts of animals become engineered to accomplish certain things, but it is 
not like a design engineer in that it doesn’t have long-term foresight.”  Presumably, only humans possess 
this foresight and can anticipate that if they move from (3,3), it will not necessarily induce their best 
outcome of (4,1) or (1,4) but, instead, may trigger a countermove by the player receiving 1 to (2,2).  
Because this outcome is worse for both players than (3,3), (3,3) is a “nonmyopic equilibrium” in PD if the 
players start at this outcome and think ahead (Brams and Wittman, 1981; Kilgour, 1984; Brams, 1994).  
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Because of such farsighted calculations on both sides, the crisis subsided and war was 
averted, though some argue that the game played resembled Chicken (game 8 in Figure 
1) more than PD.4 
Farsighted thinking aside, what resolution does democracy, and voting in 
particular, offer in PD, Chicken, and the other difficult games we present later?  Assume 
that the players in the preceding Prisoners’ Dilemma can first vote on whether to 
contribute or not contribute to financing the renovation of the park.  If a majority (i.e., 
both players) must vote to finance the park in order that it be renovated, then their 
choices and the resulting outcomes are shown in the game below: 
Rest of Public
! 
" 
Wealthy Individual 
! 
" 
Vote to finance Vote not to finance 
Vote to finance Full renovation: (3,3) No renovation: (2,2) 
Vote not to finance No renovation: (2,2) No renovation: (2,2) 
 
Key: (x, y) = payoff ranking to (wealthy individual, rest of public), where 4 = best, 3 =  
         next best, 2 = next worst, and 1 = worst. 
         Nash equilibrium underscored. 
Notice that the option that the park be partially renovated does not appear in the 
payoff matrix.  Instead, the outcomes are starker: The park is either fully renovated or not 
renovated, which renders the cooperative outcome of full renovation the unique Pareto-
optimal Nash equilibrium;5 moreover, it is supported by weakly dominant strategies of the 
                                                 
4 Like PD, the cooperative outcome in Chicken is a nonmyopic, but not a Nash, equilibrium.  In fact, the 
game that best models this crisis, and its resolution, is probably neither PD nor Chicken but a different 
game (Brams, 1994, pp. 130-138).  
5 This equilibrium is Pareto-optimal, or efficient, because no other outcome is better for both players than 
(3,3).  Although the lower-right (2,2) outcome is also a Nash equilibrium, and therefore stable, the players 
would have no reason to choose it over the (3,3) outcome, to which it is Pareto-inferior.  
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players.6  This transformation may be viewed as a mapping of two of the four outcomes 
in the PD (full renovation and no renovation) into the new game, with voting determining 
which outcomes these two outcomes replace.  
Note that this solution does not assume any kind of reciprocity or trust among 
players, as discussed in Sugden (2009).  The “team reasoning” that he prefers to invoke 
to solve a sequential PD, based on the “collective intentions” of players, is also not 
required, because individual rationality alone is sufficient to induce the cooperative 
outcome in the transformed voting game.  In the parlance of economics, voting 
internalizes (i.e., renders rational) the positive externality of cooperation (i.e., voting to 
finance the public good). 
3.  Resolution by Voting in an n-Person PD 
To extend this resolution of a 2-person PD to an n-person public-goods game, 
assume there are n ≥ 2 players and two strategies, Cooperate (C) and Defect (D), that 
each player can choose.  If k players cooperate, the payoff to each cooperator is the 
amount c(k), where k = 1, 2, . . ., n, and the payoff to each defector is the amount d(k), 
where k = 0, 1, . . ., n–1.7  An n-person game that satisfies the three properties given 
below mimics the characteristics of the 2-person PD: 
Properties of n-Person PD 
                                                 
6 Why “weakly”?  Unlike PD, each player’s cooperative strategy associated with (3,3) is not strictly better, 
whichever strategy the other player chooses: If the other player votes not to finance, either voting to finance 
or voting not to finance leads to the same outcome of (2,2).  Because of this “tie,” voting to finance is not 
always better than voting not to finance. 
7 Because c(k) and d(k) are indexed differently, we can compare c(k) and d(k–1) over all k, as we do in 
property (2) below. 
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1. The payoffs c(k) and d(k) are increasing in k.  That is, when more players 
cooperate, all benefit—whether they chose C or D—because more of the public 
good is provided. 
2. For each k = 1, 2, . . ., n, c(k) < d(k–1).  That is, comparing the situations in 
which there are (i) k cooperators and (ii) k – 1 cooperators after the defection of 
a cooperator, each of the defectors in the latter situation receives a greater 
payoff than each of the cooperators in the former situation, given that the 
strategies of all other players are fixed.   
3. c(n) > d(0).  That is, when all players choose D, the resulting outcome is 
Pareto-inferior, or worse for all players, than the outcome in which all 
cooperate.  
Property 2 implies that, for each player, C is a strictly dominated strategy.  To see 
this, fix a player and suppose that k – 1 other players choose C and the remaining n – k 
choose D.  Then the focal player will receive c(k) for choosing C and d(k–1) for choosing 
D.  Because this conclusion holds for every value of k, D strictly dominates C for every 
player. 
It follows that the unique Nash equilibrium in the n-person PD is for all players to 
choose D and receive d(0).   Because this strategy profile is supported by strictly 
dominant strategies, the resulting all-D Nash equilibrium is especially stable.  But by 
property 3, the nonequilibrium outcome of all-C, at which all players receive c(n), is 
strictly preferred by all players to d(0).  Thus, this n-person PD has a unique strictly 
dominant strategy of D for each player, but when all players choose it, a strictly Pareto-
inferior outcome results.       
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The resulting n-person PD has all the problems of the 2-person PD and more.  
When there are only two players, they may well stabilize the cooperative outcome by 
implementing an enforcement mechanism, such as regular inspections in an arms-control 
agreement, that transforms the PD into a more benevolent game, with the cooperative 
outcome as the unique Nash equilibrium.  
But if there are many players,8 this becomes far less feasible—short of 
transforming the game into a voting game, as we will show next.  Whereas the voting 
game we described in section 2 required that only two players agree to contribute to 
renovation of the park, we now propose that a decision rule be fixed which determines 
whether a public good is provided.  More specifically, we assume that with the 
introduction of voting by the players, the n-person PD is played according to the rules 
given below: 
Rules of Transformed n-Person PD     
1. A decision rule r, satisfying 0 < r ≤ n, is fixed and announced to all players. 
2. The players vote, independently and simultaneously, for either C or D. 
3. If the number of players that vote for C is m < r, then the all-D outcome is 
implemented, so all players receive d(0).  But if m ≥ r, then the all-C outcome 
is implemented, so all players receive c(n). 
                                                 
8 In the preceding example, we treated the “rest of the public” as a single player, but if the game is among  
many similar players, then it is properly modeled as an n-person PD.  To ameliorate the problem of 
defections in such a game, wealthy individuals often commit to match the donations of small contributors, 
thereby enhancing the incentive of these individuals to contribute by guaranteeing that their donations will 
be increased by some factor. 
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It is easy to check that a player’s choice of C or D only affects its payoff when 
exactly r – 1 other players choose C.  In this case, the player receives c(n) for choosing C 
and d(0) for choosing D; by property 3, the player prefers c(n).   
Because voting for C sometimes results in a better outcome and never results in a 
worse outcome, it is a weakly dominant strategy, as it is in the transformed 2-person PD.  
Thus, the all-C outcome, supported by the players’ weakly dominant strategies of voting 
for C, is the unique Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium in the transformed n-person PD.9   
4.  Example of an n-Person PD 
Suppose there are n = 10 players, and the payoff functions to the cooperators and 
the defectors are c(k) = 10k – 50 and d(k) = 10k.  It is easy to show that the three 
properties of an n-person PD are satisfied:  
1. The payoffs to the players are increasing in k. 
2. c(k) = 10k – 50 < d(k–1) = 10(1–k), which simplifies to –50 < –10 and so is 
satisfied.   
3. c(n) = 100 – 50 > d(0) = 0, which simplifies to 50 > 0 and so is satisfied. 
Let k = 1,  2, . .  ., 10.   The payoff for being the kth cooperator, c(k)—as opposed to 
defecting and there being one less cooperator, d(k–1)—are shown for representative 
values of k in the table below: 
No. of coop- 
erators 
! 
" 
k = 1 k = 2 k = 5 k = 9 k = 10 
                                                 
9 Hardin (1971) shows that all-C is a Condorcet choice when pitted against any other strategy 
combination—that is, a majority of voters would prefer it, except in the case of a tie—but he does not 
provide a procedure that would implement all-C.  
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c(k) –40 –30 0 40 50 
d(k–1) 0 10 40 80 90 
 
Notice that k = 5 cooperators make the value of cooperation, c(5) = 0, equal to the value 
of defection by everybody, d(0) = 0, in the n-person PD.  Thus, 5 cooperators is the 
breakeven number at which funding the project has the same value for the cooperators as 
not funding it.   
Whereas all-D at d(0) is the Nash equilibrium in the n-person PD, all-C at c(10), 
which gives a payoff of 50 to each player, is not an equilibrium.  The latter outcome is 
unstable because if one player defects from all-C, he or she receives a payoff of d(9) = 
90.  In fact, as we know from the previous analysis, every player has a strictly dominant 
strategy of defecting in the n-person PD, however many cooperators there are.  
Now assume simple-majority rule is used in the transformed n-person PD (i.e., r = 
6), so if there are 5 or fewer cooperators, no project is funded.  But if there are 6 or more 
cooperators, everyone, including the defectors, gets a payoff of 50.  If we depict the game 
as a 10-dimensional array in which each of the 10 players can choose between C and D, 
then C weakly dominates D for each player, whatever the value of r is, but the 
contingency in which C makes a difference (by raising a player’s payoff from 0 to 50) 
changes when r changes. 
Although the value of r does not affect the weak dominance of C, it would be 
strange indeed if r were not at least a simple majority (6 in our example), because less 
than a majority of cooperators could implement a project, perhaps against the wishes of a 
majority.  (In the extreme case, it would be a single player—a dictator, in effect—that 
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would call the shots.)  Accordingly, we propose that r be at least a simple majority in the 
transformed n-person PD.  
In fact, a simple majority may be preferable to a qualified majority, because a 
simple majority is more robust against defectors.  Thus in our example, selecting r = 6 
means that even if up to 4 players choose D (for whatever reasons), the majority would 
still triumph, whereas this would not be the case for a greater r.  In particular, if r = 10 
(unanimity), one defector can undermine the choice of C by the other 9 players.  
Finally, we introduce a note of caution on the link between voting and democracy.  
While free and fair elections are a key to democracy, our solution to the free-rider 
problem is also applicable to oligarchies, wherein only few members of an elite (e.g., the 
10 players in our previous example) vote.  Insofar as elites are elected to councils or 
legislatures, however—as occurs in a representative democracy—we think it fair to say 
that voting by these voting bodies resolves the free-rider problem in a way akin to voting 
by all the citizens in the electorate.  
5.  A Biblical Tale 
A story from the Hebrew Bible illustrates how a group, aided by a charismatic 
leader, may resolve an n-person PD when individuals alone cannot not do so.10  The story 
begins after Moses descends from Mount Sinai and discovers that the Israelites, who had 
                                                 
10 This story is adapted from Brams (2000, 2003, pp. 94-98), but the interpretation of Moses’s resolution of 
an n-person PD via a kind of referendum is new.  Passages from the Bible are drawn from The Torah: The 
Five Books of Moses (1962).  Schelling (1978, ch. 7) gives several contemporary examples of n-person 
PDs, such as whether a hockey player should wear a helmet, which was not mandated by the National 
Hockey League (NHL) until the 1990s.  Prior to 1990, most players refused to wear helmets because it put 
them at a strategic disadvantage, limiting their peripheral vision, though they were at a substantially greater 
risk of serious head injury.  The dilemma was resolved not by a secret vote of the players, which arguably 
would have led to the requirement of helmets in the 1970s, but by a public outcry caused by head injuries, 
which put pressure on the NHL.  Even so, players who entered the league before the helmet requirement 
were exempted; the last player to refuse to wear a helmet retired in 1997.        
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grown restive during his absence of forty days and forty nights, had built, with the 
complicity of Aaron (Moses’s brother), a golden calf that they worshiped. 
Observing the revelry of the Israelites at the base of the mountain, Moses is 
enraged and destroys the Ten Commandments.  But he must also deal with another 
problem—the extreme anger of God, who is infuriated by the idolatry of the Israelites 
and threatens to destroy them:   
“I see this as a stiffnecked people.  Now, let Me be, that My anger may blaze forth 
against them and I may destroy them, and make of you a great nation.”  But Moses 
implored the LORD his God, saying, “Let not Your anger, O Lord, blaze forth 
against Your people, who You delivered from the land of Egypt with great power 
and a mighty hand.  Let not the Egyptians say, ‘It was with evil intent that He 
delivered them, only to kill them off in the mountains and annihilate them from the 
face of the earth.’”  (Exod. 32:9-12) 
Moses offers a cogent reason why the Israelites should be spared, asking God to 
turn from Your blazing anger, and renounce the plan to punish Your people.  
Remember Your servants, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, how You swore to them by 
Your Self and said to them: I will make your offspring as numerous as the stars of 
heaven, and I will give to your offspring this whole land of which I spoke, to 
possess forever.  And the LORD renounced the punishment He had planned to 
bring upon His people.  (Exod. 32:14-15). 
Thus God, realizing the enormous investment he has made in His chosen people, does not 
brush aside His handiwork out of pique.   
Although God relents, Moses must still convince Him that His decision to save His 
chosen but “stiffnecked” people, who had “acted basely” (Exod. 32:7), is not a foolish 
one.  After wringing a confession out of Aaron for his part in the idolatrous affair, Moses 
looks with horror on the Israelites, who are “out of control” (Exod. 32:25).   
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Moses averts catastrophe by seizing the initiative: “Whoever is for the LORD, 
come here” (Exod. 32:26).  Moses’s gamble pays off, at least for one tribe: 
And all the Levites rallied to him.  He said to them, “Thus says the LORD, the 
God of Israel: Each of you put sword on thigh, go back and forth from gate to gate 
throughout the camp, and slay brother, neighbor, and kin.”  The Levites did as 
Moses had bidden, and some three thousand of the people fell that day.  And 
Moses said, “Dedicate yourselves to the LORD this day—for each of you has been 
against son and brother, that He may bestow blessing upon you today.” (Exod. 
32:26-29).  
 
I interpret Moses’s summons to “come here” as less a command than a desperate 
plea for a sizeable number—if not a majority—of the Israelites to rally to the side of the 
LORD and renounce their sinful behavior.  In effect, Moses, acting as a political 
entrepreneur, asks for the Israelites to vote in a referendum on his leadership. 
If only a few Israelites had heeded Moses’s plea and supported him, their numbers 
would not have been sufficient to persuade God that they were willing to turn from their 
idolatrous ways and worship Him as their rightful God, “who brought you out of the land 
of Egypt!” (Exod. 22:8).  But Moses wants not just a vote of confidence but also seeks 
the annihilation of all dissidents.   
This serves his and God’s purpose by wiping out the last vestiges of idolatry 
among the Israelites.  That the faithful are spared reinforces God’s message since the 
time of Adam and Eve—He is stern in punishing sinners—but He is also merciful in 
protecting those who redeem themselves. 
Effectively, Moses’s solution to the n-person PD—whereby D is for the Israelites 
to continue to worship the golden calf and C is for them to return to the God of Israel—is 
to eliminate the outcome in which some Israelites choose D and some choose C.  True, it 
is nowhere specified that if r Israelites choose C, C will be implemented.  To prevent 
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defections from this outcome, Moses deemed it necessary that those who chose D be 
decimated.  This is a gruesome way to achieve consensus, but it is hardly unknown in 
recent times. 
The solution worked, at least for a while.  (The Israelites become restive again.)  
However, we strongly recommend voting, without the sacrifice, as a more civilized way 
to resolve n-person PDs.              
6.  Other Difficult Games 
The hypothetical example we discussed in section 4 illustrates a public-goods or 
common-pool game (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, 1994), in which there is a free-rider 
problem unless a mechanism like voting is introduced to transform the game into one that 
encourages cooperation—and the resulting outcome is indeed implemented.   In the 
biblical example in section 5, no Israelite alone has an incentive to support Moses—
knowing that his or her faith in God will not appease Moses or save the Israelites from 
the wrath of God—but if Moses can turn the game into a referendum on his leadership 
and rally a sufficient number to his cause to show their collective commitment, then he 
can snuff out idolatry, especially if those that refuse to go along are eliminated.  Note that 
this kind of commitment is public, whereas voting about the provision of public goods 
will generally be private.11  
                                                 
11 The privacy of a voting booth is important if voters might be under social pressure to vote differently if 
their votes were known.  To be sure, this social pressure might be critical to the passage of certain kinds of 
legislation, such as that backed by a political party that can punish defectors when there is a roll call vote.  
Perhaps the support that Moses, who was a Levite, received from his fellow Levites was reinforced by the 
public nature of those rallying to his side gave him.  By contrast, the ringleaders on a ship who pledge in 
writing to participate in a mutiny are immediately identifiable, and subject to severe punishment, if they are 
discovered before the mutiny and were the first to sign the pledge.  The institutional solution that mutineers 
devised to prevent the discovery of the ringleaders was to write their names in a circle (“round robin”) 
(Leeson, 2007).  
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PD is only one of the 57 distinct 2
! 
"2 strict ordinal games of conflict, in which 
there is no mutually best (4,4) outcome.12  How many of these games can be transformed 
into more cooperative games through voting? 
Define a cooperative outcome in a 2
! 
"2 strict ordinal game to be one in which each 
of the two players obtains either its best (4) or its next-best (3) outcome.  Call the players’ 
strategies associated with this outcome cooperative strategies.  Call the other player 
strategies noncooperative strategies, and the outcome associated with these the 
noncooperative outcome.  A 2
! 
"2 strict ordinal game is difficult if it satisfies the 
following three conditions: 
1. There is only one cooperative outcome. 
2. The cooperative outcome is not a Nash equilibrium, so at least one player has 
an incentive to defect from it. 
3. The noncooperative outcome is Pareto-inferior to the cooperative outcome, so 
both players would prefer the cooperative outcome to it.  
                                                 
12 If we include games with (4,4) outcomes, there would be 21 additional games, making for a total of 78 
distinct 2 x 2 strict ordinal games (Rapoport and Guyer, 1966, 1978); see Robinson and Goforth (2005) for 
a further elaboration of these games and their properties.  We exclude the games with (4,4) outcomes, 
because these outcomes are the unique Pareto-optimal Nash equilibria in them, rendering (4,4) the likely 
outcome that players would choose without the need for voting.  The one exception is a game variously 
referred to as Stag Hunt, Assurance, or Coordination (Skyrm, 2004): 
                              
(4,4) (1,3) 
(3,1) (2,2) 
 
If either player in this game chooses its second strategy, it assures itself of a minimum of 2, whereas 
choosing its first strategy may lead to 1.  Thus, a player’s second strategy is, in a sense, less risky; its 
choice by both players yields (2,2), which is a Nash equilibrum, albeit Pareto-inferior to (4,4). 
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Obviously, 2-person PD meets these conditions, but so do the ten other games shown in 
Figure 1.13  The eleven games, which constitute 19 percent of all the 2
! 
"2 conflict games, 
can be broken down into three classes: 
Figure 1 about here 
1. The Nash equilibria in four games, including PD, are the Pareto-inferior 
noncooperative outcomes.  Either one or both (in the case of PD) players has a 
strictly dominant strategy associated with this equilibrium, and neither player 
has a dominant strategy associated with the cooperative outcome.   
2. The Nash equilibia in three games, including Chicken, destabilize the 
cooperative outcome by inducing the player(s) receiving a payoff of 3 at the 
cooperative outcome to defect from it. 
3. Three games have no Nash equilibria, with one player having an incentive to 
defect from each outcome, including the cooperative outcome. 
Note that only PD and Chicken are symmetric games, in which the payoff ranks along the 
diagonal are the same and the payoff ranks along the off-diagonal are mirror images of 
each other.  
Clearly, the cooperative outcome in all eleven games has a shaky status because it 
is not a Nash equilibrium.  But when these games are transformed into voting games in 
the manner we illustrated for PD, the cooperative outcomes take on a new status: Each 
                                                 
13 Schelling (1978, ch. 7) offers a different classification of PD and non-PD games, using lines and curves 
on a graph.  Still other classifications of the 78 2 
! 
"  2 strict ordinal games, which include the 57 games of 
conflict and 21 games with a mutually best (4,4) outcome, are given in Rapoport and Guyer (1966, 1976) 
and Brams (1977); a topology of such games, and even a new classification in a “periodic table,” are 
developed in Robinson and Goforth (2005). 
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becomes the unique Nash equilibrium, stabilized by the weakly dominant strategies that 
support it. 
 Unlike PD, we will not try to illustrate these games with examples.  But it is worth 
noting that whether all players receive the same payoff of 3 at the cooperative outcome, 
or one set of players receives 3 and the other set 4 so their benefits differ (think of 
frequent and infrequent users of a public park), neither set has an incentive to defect from 
this outcome in the transformed voting game.  
If this outcome does not receive at least r votes, its failure cannot be attributed to a 
public-goods or free-rider problem.  Rather, it fails because more voters view the 
provision of the public good as detrimental—that is, they see the cooperative outcome as 
Pareto-inferior, not Pareto-superior, to the noncooperative outcome.  Put another way, it 
is a public bad, presumably because of its cost, unworthy of their support. 
7.  Conclusions 
Democracy resolves conflict in difficult games like PD and Chicken by stabilizing 
their cooperative outcomes.  It does so by transforming them into games in which voters 
are presented with a dichotomous choice between a cooperative outcome and a Pareto-
inferior noncooperative outcome.  In the transformed game, it is always rational for 
voters to vote for the cooperative outcome, because C is a weakly dominant strategy 
independent of the decision rule r and the number of voters who choose C.  
Why, then, is the cooperative outcome not always selected, given that voters have 
no incentive to be free riders in the transformed game?  The answer is that the public 
good may not be viewed by enough voters to be worth the cost of providing it.  This 
explanation for the failure of cooperation—that a majority see the public good as, in fact, 
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a public bad—is very different from the claim that free riders undercut the provision of 
public goods in a democracy.  They do so only if enough voters view them as public 
bads.   
What is “enough”?  We suggested that simple-majority rule is more robust than 
qualified majority rule, because it is not so vulnerable to defectors who may, perhaps out 
of ignorance, fail to recognize what a majority see as a genuine public benefit.   
Even charismatic leaders like Moses, whose brilliant defense of the Israelites—
despite their serious lapses—persuaded God that they deserved a reprieve, cannot act 
alone.  He succeeded by persuading the Levites, in a kind of referendum, to renounce 
their idolatry and, less defensibly, slaughter those who did not go along.    
In a standard 2-person PD, it would be odd indeed to ask the players to vote on 
whether to select C and, if both do, implement the cooperative outcome.  The difficulty of 
doing so—say, in an arms race—is that there may be no mechanism to enforce 
cooperation, even when both sides agree to it.  Choosing a strategy, and enforcing the 
outcome that the players support, may be two entirely different matters.   
On the other hand, when a government can credibly commit to providing a public 
good that a majority support, the solution that democracy provides is compelling.  
However, in situations in which crime or corruption is rampant, or social capital or trust 
are lacking, voters will need assurances that procedures have been put in place that 
ensure that a cooperative outcome that a majority supports will actually be implemented.   
Enforcement is particularly a problem in developing countries, though lax 
enforcement of laws occurs in developed countries as well.  Thus, while the appeal of 
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democracy is considerable in difficult games, questions about how, practically, to resolve 
conflicts and implement cooperative outcomes must also be answered.14   
                                                 
14 Beginning in the 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union were able to reach limited arms-control 
agreements, because both aides could detect violations of these agreements with a sufficiently high 
probability (e.g., via satellite reconnaissance) and take appropriate countermeasures if a violation were 
detected.  By and large, this deterred both superpowers from violating these agreements.   
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Figure 1 
Eleven Difficult Games 
Class 1 (4 games) 
       1 (27)                              2 (28)                               3 (32)                              4 (48) 
(3,4) (1,2)  (3,4) (1,3)  (3,3) (1,4)  (3,4) (1,1)  
 (4,1) (2,3)  (4,1) (2,2)  (4,1) (2,2)  (4,2) (2,3) 
 
                                         Prisoners’ Dilemma 
Class 2 (4 games) 
       5 (22)                               6 (35)                              7 (50)                               8 (57) 
(3,3) (2,4)  (4,3) (2,4)  (4,3) (2,4)  (3,3) (2,4)  
 (4,1) (1,2)  (3,1) (1,2)  (3,2) (1,1)  (4,2) (1,1) 
 
                                                                                                                         Chicken 
Class 3 (3 games) 
       9 (29)                             10 (31)                             11 (46)                               
(4,3) (1,4)  (4,3) (1,4)  (3,4) (2,1) 
(3,2) (2,1)  (2,2) (3,1)  (4,2) (1,3) 
 
                                   
 
 
Key: (x, y) = payoff ranking to (row, column), where 4 = best, 3 = next best, 2 = next  
         worst, and 1 = worst.  
         Cooperative outcomes in boldface; Nash equilibria underscored.   
         Numbers of games in parentheses are those given in Brams (1994, pp. 217-219). 
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